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Private Equity Investment in Failed Banks: Appropriate Investors
Welcome
I. INTRODUCTION

One hundred sixty-nine insured depository institutions'
have failed since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008.2 One hundred forty failed in 2009,' the
greatest number of failures since 1992. 4 More bank failures are
expected.5 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC)
list of problem banks includes an additional 552 banks, up from
416 during the second quarter of 2009.6 Some insiders predict as
many as 3,000 banks will fail over the next two years.7 Bank

1. The term "insured depository institution" refers to "any bank or savings
association the deposits of which are insured" by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)
(2006). A bank is "any national bank, State bank, and any Federal branch and
insured branch." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1)(A). A bank holding company is any
company that has control over any bank. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006).
2. See FDIC, Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (covering bank failures between Sept. 15, 2008
and Jan. 29, 2010).
3. See id.
4. One hundred seventy-nine insured depository institutions failed in 1992, the
last of seven consecutive years with more than 140 bank failures. 1,970 of the 2,598
failed banks since 1980 failed between 1986 and 1992. FDIC, Failures and Assistance
Transactions, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited
Feb. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Failures and Assistance Transactions] (summary report of
years 1980-2010).
5. Kevin Brown, Insurance Fund Indicators, 3 FDIC Q., 16 (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/ (noting the FDIC list of
"problem institutions" grew to 552); see also Press Release, FDIC, FDIC-Insured
Institutions Lost $3.7 Billion in the Second Quarter of 2009, Total Reserves of the
Deposit Ins. Fund Stood at $42 Billion, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/
pr09153.html (Aug. 27, 2009).
6. Ross Waldrop, Insured Institution Performance, 3 FDIC Q., 4, (Sept. 2009),
availableat http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/.
7. See Arleen Jacobius, Managers Eager to Get a Crack at Bank Holdings,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20090907/PRINTSUB/309079968&crit=Managers%20Eager%20to%2
OGet%20a%20Crack%20at%2OBank%2OHoldings.
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failures have cost the FDIC billions of dollars and have depleted
the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).8
Troubled banks have attracted the attention of some
private equity investors. These investors believe the combination
of discounted asset prices 9 and government guarantees against
potential losses'0 will allow failed banks to yield the return on
investment that they demand."
However, federal regulations significantly restrict private
equity investors' ability to invest in failed banks. Private equity
investors eager to invest in failed banks hope federal bank
regulators will lower the regulatory barriers to private equity
investment in failed insured depository institutions. 3 Thus far,
however, private equity investors have received a mixed reception
from bank regulators, 4 who are concerned that private equity
investors may cause more damage to an already battered
industry. Nevertheless, the need for capital is too great to dismiss
private equity completely, 16 and bank regulators have taken a
8. Brown, supra note 5 (reporting the DIF stood at a negative $8.2 billion
balance); see Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton on Special Assessment,
Restoration Plan and Proposal for Maintaining Fund Liquidity to the Bd. of Dir.
(Sept. 28, 2009), availableat www.fdic.gov/news/board/Sept29nol.pdf (discussing the
FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund Restoration Plan).
9. See Edmund L. Andrews, F.D.I.C. Sells FailedBank's Troubled Mortgages to
PrivateInvestor, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at B3.
10. See infra Part III, pp. 411-16; Jacobius, supra note 7.
11.

GEORGE FENN ET AL., FED. RES. BD., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE

EQUITY MARKET 20 (1995), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Staff
Studies/1990-99/ss168.pdf (private equity investors expect a thirty-five percent or
greater return on investment).
12. See infra Part 2.A.
13. See Comment Letter from Private Equity Commenters, to Robert E.
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Private
Equity Commenters] (writing on behalf of The Blackstone Group, CenterBridge
Partners, Corsair Capital, Irving Place Capital, Lightyear Capital, Oak Hill Capital
Partners, and TPG Capital).
14. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP to Clients & Friends: Private Equity
Investment in Troubled Banks (July. 15, 2009), http://www.cadwalader.com/listclientfriend.php [hereinafter Cadwalader, Private Equity].
15. FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP, LEGAL NEWS ALERT: REAL ESTATE, FDIC ADOPTS
RULES TO ATTRACT PRIVATE EQUITY PURCHASERS OF FAILED BANKS LEGAL NEWS
ALERT: REAL ESTATE (Foley & Lardner LLP) Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.foley.com/
publications/pub-detail.aspx?pubid=6363 [hereinafter Foley & Lardner].
16. See generally Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,440 (effective Aug. 26, 2009), availableat www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2009/O9FinalSOP92.pdf [hereinafter Final Policy Statement]
(providing guidelines for private equity investment in failed banks).
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series of small steps towards allowing private equity investment in
failed banks. 7
Beginning in the fall of 2008, a series of actions by the
Federal Reserve Board (Board),18 the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), and the FDIC lowered barriers for private
equity investment in failed insured depository institutions.' In the
wake of these changes the FDIC, in its role as receiver of failed
banks,20 received bids from private equity firms to acquire the
In two instances, the
assets and liabilities of failed banks.
and BankUnited
(IndyMac)
Bank
F.S.B.
resolutions of IndyMac
F.S.B. (BankUnited), the FDIC determined that a group of private
equity investors were "appropriate" investors and allowed them to
2
In the press
purchase a failed insured depository institution.
release announcing the resolution of BankUnited, the FDIC
announced that it would issue guidelines to clarify its policy
regarding private equity investment in failed banks. 3
In crafting its policy on the qualification for failed bank
acquisitions, the FDIC attempted to balance the need for
investment in the banking sector and its duty to minimize losses to
the DIF.2 4 On July 2, 2009, the FDIC issued a Proposed Statement
of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions
(Proposed Policy Statement) for comment2' After receiving sixtyone individual comment letters and 3,190 form letter comments,
the FDIC issued a Final Statement of Policy (Final Policy

17. See Cadwalader, Private Equity, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining bank
regulators' responses to increased private equity interest in acquiring insured
depository institutions).
18. Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.144 (2008).
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §1811(b) (2006).
21. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 16.
22. See Jacobius, supra note 7.
23. Press Release, FDIC, BankUnited Acquires the Banking Operations of
BankUnited, FSB, Coral Gables, Fla. (May 21, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
press/2009/prO9072.html [hereinafter Press Release, BankUnited].
24. See Eric Lipton, As Investors Circle Ailing Banks, Fed Sets Limits,
N.Y.TiMEs, May 6, 2009, at Al, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/05/06/business/
06equity.html?p.
25. Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions,
74 Fed. Reg. 32,920 (proposed July 2, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed Policy Statement].
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Statement) effective August 26, 2009.26 Whereas the preceding
actions by the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC easing restrictions
on private equity investment in failed banks represented steps to
facilitate private equity investment in failed banks,27 the Final
Policy Statement adds new regulations on top of existing bank and
thrift regulatory requirements. 8 The Final Policy Statement
allows private equity investment, but it also creates "significant
restrictions" for such investment.2 9 The question remains, will the
restrictions keep private equity investors from investing in failed
insured depository institutions?
Part II of this Note discusses the regulatory barriers to
private equity investment in failed banks and the recent actions by
bank regulators prior to the promulgation of the Final Policy
Statement that slightly eased them.3 Next, Part III explores the
FDIC's motivations for encouraging increased private equity
investments in failed banks and the two instances where the FDIC
accepted bids from private equity investors before issuing the Final
Policy Statement.3' The provisions of the Final Policy Statement,
their differences from the Proposed Policy Statement, and the
FDIC's response to comments to the Proposed Policy Statement
are examined in Part IV.

2

Then, Part V analyzes the trends in

bank resolution since the promulgation of the Final Policy
Statement, including acquisitions by groups of private equity
investors.33

26. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,440.
27. Foley & Lardner, supra note 15; Andrew Demetriou et al., FULBRIGHT &
JAWORSKI, LLP, FULBRIGHT BRIEFING: FDIC ADOPTS FINAL POLICY ON INVESTMENT
BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN FAILED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub-id=4097&si
teid=494&detail=yes.
28. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY: FDIC FINAL STATEMENT OF POLICY
ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR FAILED BANK ACQUISITIONS

3 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter

Arnold & Porter].
29. See Cadwalader, Private Equity, supra note 14; Foley & Lardner, supra note
15; Demetriou et al., supra note 27.
30. See infra Part II, pp. 407-11.
31. See infra Part III, pp. 411-16.
32. See infra Part IV, pp. 416-26.
33. See infra Part V, pp. 427-31.
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II. THE
A.

LIMITS TO PRIVATE

EQUITY INVESTMENT IN FAILED BANKS

Regulatory Restrictions

Two federal statutes regulate private equity investment in
failed banks: the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 34 and the
Change in Bank Control Act (CIBCA).35 Under both acts, an
entity with control over a bank must register with the appropriate
regulatory agency and be subject to the provisions of the37
36
corresponding act. The acts have different definitions of control

and under each
38
consequences.

a control determination

carries

different

1. Control and its Implications under the BHCA
Any company with "control" over a bank is automatically a
bank holding company and subject to the provisions of the
BHCA.39

A "company" includes "any corporation, partnership,

business trust, association, or similar organization." 4 There are
three ways a company can have control over a bank. 41 First, a
company has control over a bank if it, "directly or indirectly...
controls, or has power to vote [twenty-five] per centum or more of
any class of voting securities of the bank., 42 Likewise, a company
that "in any manner" controls the elections of the majority of
directors or trustees of a bank exerts control over the bank.4 3
Finally, after due process proceedings, the Board may determine
that a company exercises control over a bank. 44

34.
35.
36.
(2006).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (2006).
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.5
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1841(a)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 18170).
§ 1841(a)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 18170).
§ 1841(a)(1).
§ 1841(b).
§ 1841(a)(2).
§ 1841(a)(2)(A).
§ 1841(a)(2)(B).
§ 1841(a)(2)(C).
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Controlling a bank requires registration as a bank holding
company, and therefore being subject to the limitations of the
BHCA and the accompanying Board regulations. 4 The most
significant limitation is that bank holding companies may only
engage in activities closely related to banking.46 Thus, registering
as a bank holding company would significantly limit a private
equity firm's ability to function by prohibiting it from investing in
businesses not closely related to banking. 47
Bank holding
companies must also act as a "source of strength" for their
subsidiary banks, which may require the bank holding company to
make capital interventions or repay the FDIC for any losses the
FDIC incurs as a result of troubled banks within the holding
company. 48 This provision means that private equity investors
could be liable to••the49FDIC for losses from unrelated funds within
a private equity firm.
2. Control under CIBCA
The CIBCA has wider applicability than the BHCA
because its definition of "person" includes entities that do not
qualify as a "company" or "bank" under the BHCA. 0 A person
has "control" of an insured depository institution if it has the
''power . . . to direct management or policies of an insured
depository institution" or the ability to vote twenty-five percent or
more of any class of an insured depository institution's voting
securities." The consequence of control under CIBCA is that
45. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.5
(2006).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 225.21(a).
47. See id.
48. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1).
49. See Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13, at 6 (arguing against the
"source of strength" requirement).
50. Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(A) (2006) (defining a
person "means an individual or a corporation, partnership, trust, associations, joint
venture, pool, syndicate, sole-proprietorship, unincorporated organization, or any
other form of entity."); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (2006); see
also Ravi R. Desai, Comment, PrivateEquity Investment in FinancialInstitutionsand
How to Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding Company, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 385, 391
(2009) (commenting investors who must register under CIBCA may not qualify as a
"company" or "bank" under the BHCA).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B).
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notice must be given to the appropriate regulatory agency and that
agency has sixty days to disapprove of any acquisition. 2
Private equity firms seeking to acquire failed banks are
both persons subject to the CIBCA and companies subject to the
BHCA. An individual private equity investor, however, may
qualify as a person under CIBCA, but not as a company under the
BHCA.
B.

Regulatory Actions FacilitatingPrivateEquity Investments
in Failedbanks

A series of recent regulatory decisions has lowered the
barriers to private equity investment in failed banks. First, in
September 2008, the Board increased the percentage of equity that
private investors may own without exerting "control" over the
bank. 3 Then, in November 2008, the OCC provided private equity
investors a formal vehicle by which to bid for failed banks. 4
Subsequently, the FDIC deepened the pool of potential investors
who may bid on failed banks to include groups with a "shelf
charter."55
The Board Policy Statement (Board Statement) 56 regarding
equity investment in banks and bank holding companies allows
private equity investors to make larger investments and exert more
influence in the governance and day-to-day policies and operations
without exercising control over the bank. 57 The Board Statement
increases the amount that equity investors may own from twenty52. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7); 12 C.F.R. § 225.43.
53. 12 U.S.C. §1841(a)(2); Policy statement on equity investments in banks and
bank holding companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Desai, supra note 50, at 395-98.
54. See Press Release, OCC, OCC Conditionally Approves First Nat'l Bank
"Shelf Charter" to Expand Pool of Qualified Bidders for Troubled Institutions (Nov.
21, 2008), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-137.htm
[hereinafter Press
Release, OCC Approves Shelf Charter]; ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP,
ORRICK CLIENT ALERT: OCC "SHELF CHARTER" FDIC TEMPORARY LIQUIDITY
GUARANTEE (Nov. 24, 2008), at 1, www.orrick.com/fileupload/1540.pdf [hereinafter

Orrick].
55. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Expands Bidder List for Troubled
Institutions (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/index.html
[hereinafter Press Release, FDIC Expands Bidder List].
56. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
57. Id.; Desai, supra note 50, at Part 2D (discussing the Board's policy statement
on equity investment in banks and bank holding companies).
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five percent to thirty-three percent provided the investor does not
own more than fifteen percent of any class of voting securities.' s
The Board Statement permits, for the first time, private equity
investors to hold as many as two seats on the board of directors
without exerting a controlling influence. 9 Finally, in a reversal of
previous policy, the Board Statement allows minority investors to
sit on committees and consult with management over the policies
and operations of the bank. 6°
Shortly thereafter, on November 21, 2008, the OCC
implemented procedural changes facilitating non-bank bidding for
failed bank assets when it granted the first "shelf charter" to Ford
Group Bank. 61 A "shelf charter" is a temporary, conditional bank
charter, which remains inactive until an investor group is in a
position to acquire a failed bank or its assets. 6622 It makes private
equity bids more competitive because the preapproval allows nonbank investors to immediately acquire the deposits and assets of
failed banks. 63 Before the shelf charter, a non-bank investor would
have to go through the charter approval process at the time of
bidding.64 The lengthy charter approval process kept private equity
firms from being able to immediately acquire deposits from the
FDIC placing private equity firms at a disadvantage.
In conjunction with the OCC's use of shelf charters, the
FDIC issued a "modified bidder qualification process," on
58. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
59. Id.; Desai, supra note 50, at 396.
60. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Desai, supra note 50, at 396.
61. See Orrick, supra note 54, at 1; see also Press Release, OCC Approves Shelf
Charter, supra note 54 (announcing the OCC's first grant of a shelf charter);
Cadwalader, Private Equity, supra note 14, at 1, 4-5, (describing the shelf charter
process).
62. WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, WOMBLE CARLYLE CLIENT
ALERT:

OCC

ACTION AIDS PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN FAILED INSTITUTIONS,

(Dec. 02. 2008), http://www.wcsr.com/client-alerts/occ-action-aids-private-equityinvestment-in-failed -institutions.
63. See Guhan Subramanian, A White Paper on the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions 14 (2009) (unpublished white paper on file with the FDIC), availableat
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2009/09c37AD47.PDF.
64. HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LLP, CLIENT ALERT: HUNTON & WILLIAMS
REPRESENTS
FIRST
"SHELF
CHARTER"
BANKS
3
(Dec.
2,
2008),
http://www.huntonfinancialindustryrecovery.com/2008/12/articles/client-alerts/hun
ton-williams-represents-first-shelf-charter-banks/.
65. See id.; Subramanian, supra note 63, at 14.
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November 26, 2008, expanding the pool of qualified bidders for
failed, insured depository institutions. 6 In the modified process,
the FDIC will grant preliminary approval for deposit insurance
based
on
abbreviated
"information
submissions
and
67
applications."
The modifications allow entities without a bank
charter, including those with shelf charters, to bid on assets and
liabilities of failed banks. 6
By permitting increased private equity ownership in banks
without triggering bank holding company status, and with the
OCC and FDIC's expansion of the universe of bidders for failed
banks, private equity investors are now more easily able to
purchase and assume the assets and liabilities of failed banks.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR INCREASED PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT

A.

The FDIC'sAttraction to PrivateEquity

One hundred sixty-nine banks have failed since the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 69 and analysts predict
70
hundreds if not thousands of banks will fail in the next two years.
Recent bank failures have steadily eroded DIF
reserves,7' leaving
72
the FDIC with a "significant need for capital.
The FDIC is attracted by the capital that private equity
investors can inject into the banking industry73 so long as the
investment will reduce the costs of bank failures to the DIF.74 The
DIF is funded by assessments levied on deposits held by insured
66. Press Release, FDIC Expands Bidder List, supra note 55.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP,

WOMBLE CARLYLE
CLIENT ALERT: FDIC EXPANDS BIDDER LIST FOR TROUBLED INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 04,

2008), http://www.wcsr.com/client-alerts/.
69. See Failed Bank List, supra note 2.
70. See Jacobius, supra note 7 (estimating 3,000 banks will eventually fail).
71. Brown, supra note 5, at 16.
72. See Michael R. Crittenden, FDIC Proposes New Bank Rules --- Restriction
on Private-Equity Bids Draws Fire; 'Harsh and Discretionary',WALL ST. J., July 3,
2009, at C3.
73. See Paul Hannon, International Finance: OECD Suggests Bank-Stake Sale
Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2009, at C2; P. Olivier Sarkozy & Randall Quarles,
Editorial, Let PrivateEquity Help the Banks, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A13.
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2006) (requiring the FDIC to find the least cost
method of resolution).
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depository institutions75 and because private equity investment
decreases costs to the DIF,16 private equity investment potentially
reduces the assessments banks and thrifts will have to pay to
restore it back within its mandated range.77 Thus, the FDIC is
looking for private equity investors willing to work within "a well
developed prudential framework [that] has long been the
dominant form of ownership of insured depository institutions."78
B.

PrivateEquity Investment in FailedBanks Before the
Proposed Policy Statement

Prior to issuing the Proposed Policy Statement, the FDIC
twice awarded winning bids for assets and liabilities of failed
depository institutions to private equity investors.7 9 IndyMac and
BankUnited were sold to a consortium of private equity
investors.8 Both consortia included private equity investors with
banking
experience,
bankng
•
81 who professed the intention to grow extensive
banking practices. Further, both transactions included loss-share
agreements
•82 and special restrictions including heightened capital
requirements.
In its announcement of the BankUnited
transaction, the FDIC announced its intention to issue guidelines
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2006).
76. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).
77. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b).
78. Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25 at 32,931-32. The framework
includes measures aimed at maintaining well capitalized bank and thrift institutions,
the ability and willingness to support banks facing difficulties, protections against
insider transactions, and ensuring that managers have the knowledge and experience
necessary to successfully operate a depository institution. Id.
79. See e.g., Associated Press, Equity PartnershipIs Formed to Buy Remnants of
IndyMac Bank for $13.9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3. 2009, at B3; Bonnie McGeer,
From Failure to FloridaPowerhouse?, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2009, at 1, available at
2009 WLNR 10159340 [hereinafter McGeer, FloridaPowerhouse?).
80. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 79; McGeer, Florida Powerhouse?,
supra note 79.
81. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 79.
82. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair's Statement on the
Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualification for Failed Bank Acquisition (July 2,
2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09112a.html
[hereinafter Press
Release, Sheila Bair's Statement]; Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Closes Sale of
Indymac Fed. Bank, Pasadena, Cal. (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
press/2009/pr09042.html [hereinafter Press Release, Sale of IndyMac] (announcing
the IndyMac loss-share agreement); Press Release, BankUnited, supra note 23
(announcing the BankUnited loss-share agreement).
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for private equity investment in failed banks and thrifts.83 The
resolutions of IndyMac and BankUnited thus provided a partial
blue print for the FDIC's policy on private equity investment in
failed banks.
1. The IndyMac Resolution
The sale of IndyMac to a group of private equity investors
was the first sale of a failed bank to a non-banking entity during
the current financial crisis. 84 The IndyMac failure in July 2008 was
history 85
the "second-largest financial institution failure in U.S.
and led to the most expensive failure of the current financial cycle
to date.86 IndyMac included amongst its $32 billion in assets: $6.5
billion in deposits, a large loan servicing business, and a reverse
mortgage business. 7 After the FDIC closed the bank, it was held
in receivership and run by the FDIC for six months before being
sold by the FDIC to a consortium of private equity investors88 and
rebranded as OneWest Bank F.S.B. (OneWest). 9
The investment group included experience investors with
experience running banks. J.C. Flowers, through his private equity
firm J.C. Flowers & Co., joined lead private equity investor Dune
Capital Management, and four other private equity or hedge
funds. 90 Flowers is a seasoned private equity investor who has

83. Press Release, BankUnited, supra note 23.
84. Bonnie McGeer, Has BankUnited Broken a Logjam for Private Equity?, AM.
BANKER, May 26, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 9922800 [hereinafter McGeer,
Logjam].
85. Kathy M. Kristof & Andrea Chang, Federal Regulators Seize Crippled
IndyMac Bank, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/ul/12/
business/fi-IndyMacl2; but see Karey Wutkowski & Megan Davies, Private Equity
Group Buying IndyMac Assets, REUTERS, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE5014DP20090102 (reporting IndyMac as the third largest failure in
U.S. history).
86. See Bonnie McGeer, Florida Powerhouse?, supra note 79 (reporting Jones
Day partner, Ralph MacDonald, estimated that the failure would cost the FDIC
$10.7 billion).
87. Associated Press, supra note 79.
88. Joe Adler, Fla.'s BankUnited Fails; to Cost DIF Nearly $5 Billion, AM.
BANKER, May 22, 2009, at 3, available at 2009 WL 9708969 [hereinafter Adler, Fla's
Bank United Fails].
89. Press Release, Sale of IndyMac, supra note 82.
90. Associated Press, supra note 79.
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been making private equity investments in banks since 2000 and
currently has bank holdings on three continents.91
The sale of IndyMac included a "loss-share" provision.92 In
a "loss-share" provision the FDIC agrees to "absorb a portion of
the loss on a specified pool of assets in order to maximize asset
recoveries and minimize FDIC losses." 93 Loss-share agreements
are traditionally entered into for commercial real estate and
residential mortgage loans. 94 While the full amount of expected
losses is counted against the DIF reserves, 95 "loss sharing reduces
the immediate cash needs of the FDIC." 96 Because the FDIC
accounts for the full amount of its expected losses against its
reserves at the time of the agreement, the FDIC benefits if losses
are less than expected because then it will not need all of the
reserves it has set aside to cover the cost of the failure. 97 Under
the terms of the IndyMac transaction, OneWest will assume the
first twenty percent of losses, and the FDIC will assume "eighty
percent of the next ten percent of losses and ninety-five percent of
losses thereafter."' 98
2. BankUnited
The purchase and assumption agreement entered into
between the FDIC and a consortium of private equity investors" in

91. William D. Cohan, Checkmate for a Wall Street Wizard, FORTUNE, Sept. 14,
2009, at 54. In May 2009, Flowers bought First National Bank of Cainvesville, a small
bank in Missouri, in his individual capacity in order to avoid restrictions the FDIC
might place on private equity firms' ownership of banks. See Lipton, supra note 24.
92. FDIC, Shared Loss Agreement Between the FDIC as Receiver for IndyMac
Federal Bank, FSB and OneWest Bank, FSB (Mar. 19, 2009), www.fdic.gov/about/

freedom/IndyMacSharedLossAgrmt.pdf
[hereinafter IndyMac Shared Loss
Agreement].
93. FDIC, Loss-Share Questions and Answers, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/in
dividual/failed/lossshare/index.html (last updated Sept. 28, 2009).
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. IndyMac Shared Loss Agreement, supra note 92, at 7; Wukowski & Davies,
supra note 85.

99. Press Release, BankUnited, supra note 23 (listing WL Ross & Co. LLC,
Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C., Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P.,
Centerbridge Capital Partners, L.P., LeFrak Organization, Inc, The Wellcome Trust,
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the resolution of BankUnited was the first instance when private
equity investors were able to assume the assets of an insured
depository institution from the FDIC immediately after its
closing.'0° With $13 billion in assets, BankUnited was the "fourthlargest thrift ever to fail," 10' and behind IndyMac, the second most
expensive resolution of 2009.'0' The resolution is estimated to have
cost the FDIC $5 billion.1 3 It was a factor in the FDIC's special
assessment to help replenish the DIF in May 2009.14 Like in the
IndyMac resolution, the consortium of investors in the
BankUnited deal included investors with experience running
banks and a loss-share provision.
The consortium of investors led by chairman and CEO of
the recapitalized BankUnited, John Kanas, a veteran banker, and
senior advisor to investment firm W.L. Ross & Co., agreed to
assume $12.7 billion of BankUnited's assets and $8.3 billion in
non-brokered deposits.105 Kanas is the former chairman and CEO
of North Fork Bank, originally a small bank in New York that he
grew to $60 billion in assets, before selling it to Capital One
Financial Corp. for $13.2 billion in 2006.1°6 His presence in the deal
was deemed as "crucial" in making the deal palatable to both
regulators and investors because of his experience growing banks
and working with bank regulators.W
Under the terms of the deal, the new investors assumed the
deposits at a $3 billion discount, ° and promised to recapitalize the
thrift with $900 million in fresh capital.10 9 The discount reflected
the low quality of the assets the investors assumed. a Real-estate
loans accounted for $10.1 billion or 98.2% of the thrift's loan
Greenaap Investments Ltd., and East Rock Endowment Fund as members of the
investment group).
100. McGeer, Logjam, supra note 84.
101. Adler, Fla.'s BankUnited Fails,supra note 88, at 3.
102. Id.; see McGeer, FloridaPowerhouse?,supra note 79.
103. Adler, Fla.'s BankUnited Fails,supra note 88, at 3.
104. See id.
105. McGeer, Logjam, supra note 84.
106. See McGeer, FloridaPowerhouse?,supra note 79.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Adler, Fla's BankUnited Fails,supra note 88, at 3.
110. McGeer, FloridaPowerhouse?, supra note 79.
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portfolio."' Half of the real-estate loans were option adjustablerate mortgages on properties in California and Florida from which
significant losses were expected.'12 No investor will own more than
a 24.9% stake in the bank, allowing the investors to avoid being
designated a bank holding company."3 The loss-share agreement
covered $10.7 billion in assets.14
The team plans to alter
BankUnited's strategy to become more like a commercial bank."'
While BankUnited will remain a thrift, it will focus on offering its
residential mortgages to a more localized market, growing its
commercial 6business, and looking for opportunities for continued
expansion."
Prompted by increased interest of private equity firms in
investing in failed insured depository institutions and guided by its
experiences from the IndyMac and BankUnited resolutions the
FDIC announced its intention to promulgate
guidelines for future
17
private equity investment in failed banks.
IV. THE FDIC's FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENT IN FAILED BANKS

Slightly more than a month later, on July, 9 2009, the FDIC
issued a proposed policy
S. , 118 statement regarding requirements for
failed bank acquisitions.
In a press release accompanying the
Proposed Policy Statement, FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair
described the statement's goals as: to maximize the prices the
FDIC receives for failed bank assets, to minimize losses to the
DIF, and to keep failed institutions from failing again." 9 She also
stressed the importance of bank owners having the experience,
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. McGeer, Logjam, supra note 84.
114. Adler, Fla's BankUnited Fails, supra note 88, at 3; McGeer, Florida
Powerhouse?,supra note 79 (stating that the FDIC will pay eighty percent of the first

$4 billion in loan-losses and ninety five percent of any additional losses).
115.
116.
117.
118.

McGeer, FloridaPowerhouse?,supra note 79.
Id.
See Press Release, BankUnited, supra note 23.
Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,931 (stating the intention of

the policy statement was to provide guidance regarding the terms and conditions for
investment and acquisitions).
119. Press Release, Sheila Bair's Statement, supra note 82.
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competence, and willingness to run the bank in a prudent manner
while supporting their banks when they face difficulties and
protecting the banks from insider transactions. 20 In other words,
she expressed that the FDIC welcomed private equity investment
within the well-developed21 framework that has been the dominant
form of bank ownership.
The Proposed Policy Statement establishes standards
providing for: capital support of the acquired depository
institution, cross support for substantially commonly owned
deposit institutions, limits on transactions with affiliates,
maintaining continuity of ownership, placing clear limits on the use
of secrecy law jurisdictions for channels of investment, limitations
on whether existing investors in an institution could bid on it if it
failed, and disclosure commitments.2 The FDIC called for public
comment on nine specific issues as well as on the Proposed Policy
Statement as a whole. 123 Chairman Bair acknowledged the
difficulties of striking the correct balance with regard1 24to the
FDIC's goals, but believed it was a "good solid document.
Not everyone agreed with Chairwoman Bair's assessment
of the proposal. Two of the FDIC's five-member board of
directors, Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan and Acting
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision John Bowman, voted
against issuing the Proposed Policy Statement.125 Dugan thought
the Proposed Policy Statement placed too many restrictions on
private equity investors.
Private equity investors agreed.2
Wilbur Ross, a billionaire private equity investor who invested in
BankUnited, called the restrictions "harsh and discriminatory"
and said the provisions "could guarantee that there [would] be no
120. Id.
121. See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,931-32.
122. Id. at 32,931.
123. Id.
124. Joe Adler, FDIC to take Second Look at PE Buyers, AM. BANKER, July 10,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 13116298 [hereinafter Adler, FDIC to Take Second
Look]; Emily Flitter, Investors, Regulators Rip Failed-Bank Plan, AM. BANKER, July
6, 2009, at 1, availableat 2009 WLNR 12721348.
125. Crittenden, supra note 72.
126. Id.
127. See Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 73; see Private Equity Commenters, supra
note 13.
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more private equity coming into banks."' Private equity investors
were particularly concerned with the capital requirement, source
of strength, cross guarantee, and holding period provisions of the
Proposed Policy Statement. 9
The FDIC received sixty-one individual comment letters
and 3,190 form letter comments in response to the Proposed Policy
Statement. 3 ° While comment letters were sent by a variety of
stakeholders, the majority of the comments were sent by private
capital firms or their representatives.13 ' After the comment period,
the FDIC issued the Final Policy Statement, effective August 26,
2009.132

The Final Policy Statement eliminates the "source of

strength" provision from the Proposed Policy Statement and
softens the capital requirements and cross support provisions.
Additionally, it keeps other provisions meant to encourage sound
banking practices the same, but provides further clarification on
133
other provisions.
The Final Policy Statement applies to private investors
seeking to invest in the assets or liabilities connected with the
resolution of a failed insured depository institution and to
applicants for federal deposit insurance for "de novo" charters
issued in connection with the failed bank resolutions. 134 The FDIC

"strongly encourages" certain types of non-controlling private
equity investment by exempting them from the provisions of the
Final Policy Statement. 135 In particular, the Final Policy Statement
exempts private equity investors who form partnerships with and

128. Crittenden, supra note 72 (explaining Wilbur Ross invested in BankUnited
through his investment firm WL Ross & Co. LLC).
129. Memorandum from Valerie Best, Assistant Executive Secretary, FDIC,
Summary of Recommendations Made at the August 5, 2009 Meeting with Private
Equity Representatives to the File (Aug. 24, 2008), www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2009/09c63AD47.PDF; see Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,442;
Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13 (commenting on behalf of private equity
firms).
130. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,441.
131. Id. at 45,441.
132. Id. at 45,446.
133. Id. at 45,447-49.
134. Id. at 45,448.
135. Id. at 45,448.
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yield management control to existing reputable bank and thrift
holding companies. 136
A.

The FinalPolicy Statement Eliminatesthe Source of
Strength Requirement

The Final Policy Statement eliminates the source of
strength requirement from the Proposed Policy Statement. 3 7 The
Proposed Policy Statement would have required "investors[']
organizational structures" to serve as a source of strength for their
subsidiary institutions. Private equity investors strongly opposed
the provision because it would make them potentially liable for
amounts exceeding the capital they invested, even though as noncontrolling investors they would lack the power to unilaterally take
actions to prevent or remedy problems which may give rise to the
need for additional capital."9

B.

The FinalPolicy Statement Modifies the Most Onerous
Provisionsof the ProposedPolicy Statement
1. Capital Requirements

The Final Policy Statement requires depository institutions
acquired by failed banks to maintain a leverage capital ratio of
Tier 1 common equity to total assets of at least ten percent for
three years from the time of acquisition.'4 The increased capital
requirements are designed to create a capital cushion with which a
bank may absorb losses during its first years of operation, but the
ten percent capital ratio minimum is slightly less than double the
136. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448. The Final Policy Statement
also exempts de minimis investors--those holding five percent or less of the total
voting power and private equity investors making investments in an insured
depository institution or its holding company that has maintained a composite
CAMELS 1 or 2 rating continuously for seven years. Id.
137. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,446.
138. Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,931.
139. See Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13.
140. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448. (defining Tier 1 common
equity as "Tier 1 capital minus non-common equity elements").
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Tier 1 ratio to which traditional bankers are subject. 4' If the Tier 1
ratio drops below ten percent during the first three years, the bank
is subject to prompt corrective action.' Though the ten percent
ratio was modified from the Proposed Policy Statement, which
called for a Tier 1 ratio of fifteen percent, the modifications do not
go as far as private equity investors who opposed the heightened
capital requirement had advocated. 43
Private equity investors expressed concern that heightened
capital commitments will place them at a competitive disadvantage
in bidding for failed banks compared to existing subsidiaries of
banks, thrifts, and holding companies, which must maintain a Tier
1 leverage ratio of only five percent.'" They argue this will force
them to take increased risks to meet their required rate of
return.4 4 The FDIC justified its heightened capital requirements
by citing the fact de novo institutions, those which were in
existence for seven years or less, are overrepresented on the failed
bank list for the years 2008 and 2009.'46

141. Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 73.
142. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448.
143. See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,933 (proposing a required
fifteen percent Tier 1 capital ratio); Best, supra note 129 (summarizing private equity
investors' suggestions on lowering the heightened capital provisions); Private Equity
Commenters, supra note 13, at 4 (commenting that heightened provisions will place
private equity firms at a competitive disadvantage bidding against existing banks and
advocating for a five percent capital ratio).
144. Arnold & Porter, supra note 28.
145. See e.g., Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,440 (Noting that the most
common capital ratio recommended by commenters was eight percent, the same ratio
de novo banks are required to maintain; more hawkish private equity investors
suggested a six percent leverage ratio.); Michael R. Crittenden & Peter Lattman,
Rules Eased on Bank buyouts --- Hurdles Lowered for Private-EquityFirms in Bid to
Drum Up New Rescuers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009 at Al (discussing private equity
firm's lobbying efforts against the Proposed Policy Statements); see Flitter, supra
note 124, at 1. Wilbur Ross reacted to the proposed capital requirements as follows:
We are being asked to take on the risks of a bank that's already failed once, to
provide new capital so that it reduces the amount of capital the
government has to put in, to introduce new management and possibly
enter into loss-sharing, and then as a reward for all that you're
condemned to a mediocre rate of return because they've forced you to
overcapitalize it.
Id.
146. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,446.
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2. Cross Support
The Final Policy Statement scales back from the Proposed
Policy Statement instances where cross support is required by
investors owning part of two or more insured depository
institutions. 47 The cross support provision is meant to ensure a
strong parent company.'9 The Proposed Policy Statement called
for investors owning a majority of the direct or indirect
investments in more than one insured depository institution to
pledge to the FDIC their proportionate interest in each institution
to cover any losses to the FDIC from the resolution of, or
assistance provided to, any other such institution.149 The Final
Policy Statement requires cross support when investors have
eighty percent common ownership, not simply a majority, of
ownership of two or more banks,5 and aligns the Final Policy
Statement with the common ownership requirement threshold for
banks to avoid Regulation W."5 '
The modification occurred in response to strong objections
to the terms
1 52 in the Proposed Policy Statement from private equity
investors.
Commenters argued that the provision would deter
private capital investment and lead to less competitive bids for
failed depository institutions because investors would not put their
other investments at risk and the provision would hinder private
equity managers' ability to invest in "two different depository
institutions through two different funds with two different sets of
investors." '53 The effect would be to make investments by a
consortium of investors, known as "club" deals, more difficult
because there are a limited number of private equity investors
interested in purchasing failed banks leading to a high possibility
of a majority overlap in ownership, thereby triggering the

147. Id. at 45,448-49.
148. Adler, FDICto take Second Look, supra note 124.
149. Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,933.
150. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448-49.
151. See Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13, at 7.
152. See Id. (objecting to the cross support provision); see generally, Proposed
Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,931 (calling for comments in regards to the
cross-guarantee provision).
153. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,443-44.
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provision. 5" The FDIC retained the flexibility to waive the cross
support provision
if enforcing it would not reduce the costs to the
5
DIF1
or
bank
C.

The FinalPolicy Statement MaintainsProvisions
EncouragingSafe and Sound Business Practices

The FDIC wants private equity investment in failed banks
and thrifts, but only to the extent it is consistent with safe and
sound banking principles.'56 The Final Policy Statement retained
provisions that promote stability and transparency, protect banks
from insider transactions, and prohibit investors in a failed
depository institution from purchasing
assets and liabilities of that
157
failed depository institution.
1. Continuity of Ownership
The Final Policy Statement, like the Proposed Policy
Statement, encourages stability and long-term investment in banks
by prohibiting non-exempt investors from selling or otherwise
transferring their shares for three years following their acquisition,
absent prior approval from the FDIC.18
Private equity
commenters objected to the required holding period, which was
longer than prevoiusprivate equity deals. 9 For example, the6
BankUnited sale included an eighteen-month holding period.' 0
Private equity investors are concerned that the longer holding
period will limit the investment's return, which is measured as a
function 6of time, and also decrease their "flexibility to raise
capital." '
154. See Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13, at 7-9; see also Cadwalader,
Private Equity, supra note 14 (arguing the Proposed Policy Statement "hesitantly"
welcomes "club" deals between private equity firms).
155. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,447.
156. Id. at 45,440.
157. See id. at 45,448-49.
158. Id. at 45,449 (describing how mutual funds are exempted from the Final
Policy Statement).
159. See Private Equity Commenters, supra note 13, at 11.
160. Flitter, supra note 124.
161. Best, supra note 129.
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Private equity investors questioned whether the holding
period prohibited them from offering shares at a public offering
during the holding period, 62 but the FDIC declined to offer further
guidance regarding this issue in the Final Policy Statement.6 6 The
FDIC did slightly modify the Proposed Policy Statement to state
that "its approval will not be unreasonably withheld in the case of
transfers to affiliates." ' '
2. Secrecy Law Jurisdictions
In an effort to increase transparency, the Final Policy
Statement, like the Proposed Policy Statement, prohibits bidders
investing in failed banks from "employing ownership structures
utilizing entities domiciled in bank secrecy jurisdictions. 1

65

The

Final Policy Statement defines a secrecy law jurisdiction as any
"country that applies a bank secrecy law that limits U.S. bank
regulators[']" ability to determine if the bank is in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. 166 The FDIC exempts investors
consolidated
subjected to the Board's "comprehensive
supervision" from the investment ban. 161 Such an agreement
''essentially" requires investors to "forgo the bank secrecy
protection afforded by the entity's jurisdiction of domicile." 1' 6 It
would also allow the FDIC to sufficiently carry out its supervisory
and enforcement duties. 169 Private equity investors argued that a
prohibition of the use of secrecy law jurisdictions obstructs private
equity investors in their efforts to achieve tax efficiency.Y° From
the perspective of the FDIC, its need to carry out its duties trumps
private equity investors' desire to maximize profits."'

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Flitter, supra note 124.
See Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,449.
Id. at 45,449; Demetriou et al., supra note 27, at 3.
Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,449.
Id.
Id.; Arnold & Porter,supra note 28, 2-3.
Arnold & Porter, supra note 28, at 2-3.
See Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,446.
Id. at 45,447.
See id. at 45,447, 45,449.
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3. Prohibition of "Silo" Structures
The Final Policy Statement clarifies that the FDIC will not
approve bids with "silo" ownership structures.1 "Silo" structures
are characterized by "[c]omplex and functionally opaque
ownership structures" where the benefits of ownership and
decision-making powers are not clear. 73 These ownership
structures "typically involve a private equity firm (or its sponsor)
that create multiple investment vehicles funded and apparently
controlled by the private equity firm (or its sponsor) to acquire
ownership of an insured depository institution.' ' 74 The FDIC is
"concerned" that silo structures are used by private equity
investors to "artificially separate the non-financial activities of the
175 in an effort to "avoid becoming
firm from its banking activities,
176
a bank holding company.,
Many advocates for private equity investment, on the other
hand, oppose the "blanket prohibition of 'silo' structures as
acquisition vehicles. 1 77 In response to the request for comment on
the Proposed Policy Statement, Dory Wiley, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Commerce Street Capital, acknowledged
some silo structures are created to avoid regulation but proposed
that silo structures willing to meet transparency requirements and
willing to "submit" to the regulations of the BHCA be allowed to
purchase failed banks. 78
Other private equity commenters
opposing a blanket prohibition of silo structures noted bifurcated
ownership and control is characteristic of many categories of
institutional investors and argued it should not be "a reason to
disqualify potential bidder[s][.]"' ' 79 A third group of commenters
argued against a strict prohibition because of a lack of an "agreed-

172. See id. at 45,447, 45,449.
173. See id. at 45,449.
174. Id. at 45,447.
175. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,447.
176. See Comment Letter from Dory Wiley, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Commerce Street Capital, LLC, to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
FDIC, at 2 (July 24, 2009).
177. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,442.
17& See Wiley, supra 176.
179. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,442.
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upon definition . . . of what constitutes a 'silo' structure."'8
Nevertheless, the FDIC is unwilling to approve such "complex and
functionally opaque" ownership structures.""
4. Insider Transactions
Protecting the banking industry from insider transactions
was a primary concern of the FDIC in crafting the Final Policy
Statement. 82 Consequently, the Final Policy Statement prohibits
insured depository institutions acquired under its provisions from
extending "credit to [the] [i]nvestors, their investment funds if any,
and any affiliates of either."'8 3 An "affiliate" is any company in
which the investor or investment fund owns or has held at least ten
percent of the equity for at least thirty days.'86 The Final Policy
Statement requires investors to make regular reports of their
affiliates to the acquired insured depository institution.'85
Although some commenters proposed easing the ban on
transactions to affiliates, 86 many private equity investors were
already offering to comply with a ban on transactions with
affiliates.'9 The Final Policy Statement indicates the FDIC views
its prohibitions against insider transactions and efforts to impede
the FDIC from carrying out its supervisory and enforcement duties
as non-negotiable.'8 8
5. Special Owner Bid Limitations
The Proposed Policy Statement makes investors holding
ten percent or more equity in a failed insured depository

180. Id.
181. Arnold & Porter, supra note 28, at 3 (quoting Final Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. at 45,449).
182. See Press Release, Sheila Bair's Statement, supra note 82.
183. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,449 (exempting existing
extensions of credit by insured depository institutions acquired by investors from the
Final Policy Statement).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 45,449.
186. Id. at 45,444.
187. See Arnold & Porter, supra note 28, at 2.
18& See Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,440.
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institution ineligible to bid on the assets or liabilities of that failed
institution.189 One commenter urged the FDIC to be more
aggressive towards investors of failed insured depository
institutions and recommended a permanent ban on private equity
investors who owned ten percent or more of any failed insured
depository institution.'9 In contrast, Dory Wiley, President and
Chief Executive Officer of Commerce Capital L.L.C., proposed
that the eligibility determination should be made on a case-by-case
basis by looking at factors such as whether the investor was an
active or passive investor in the failed institution.'91 The Final
Policy Statement, like the Proposed Policy Statement, adopted a
policy whereby under no circumstances may an investor owning
ten percent or more equity of a failed depository institution bid on
the assets or liabilities of that institution.19
6. Disclosure
The Proposed Policy Statement required covered investors
to submit to the FDIC information about its entire chain of
ownership including the size of the capital fund(s), its
diversification, return profile, marketing documents, management
team, and business model.1 93 Additionally, further disclosures are
required for entities in the ownership chain as the FDIC
determines is necessary. 94 The Final Policy Statement adopted the
disclosure requirement from the Proposed Policy Statement and
clarified that the FDIC will treat confidential information
submitted in compliance with the policy statement as confidential
business knowledge.9

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,934.
Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,445.
See Wiley, supra 176.
See Final Policy Statement, supranote 16, at 45,449.
See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 25, at 32,934.
Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,449.

195. See id. at 45,447-49.
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V. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT AFTER THE FINAL POLICY
STATEMENT

Because the Final Policy Statement was issued in August
2009, it is premature to make a dispositive claim as to the effects of
the Final Policy Statement.
However, seventy-five insured
depository institutions have failed in the interim and trends have
started to emerge.196 First, the FDIC continues to sell the majority
of its failed banks to existing banks. 97 A second trend is that both
the FDIC and private equity investors have looked for innovative
ways to meet their needs. Third, investor groups buying one bank
are likely to buy another.
The FDIC has entered into purchase and assumption
agreements with healthy banks in the majority of resolutions since

the Final Policy Statement became effective.
When the FDIC is
unable to find a buyer for the assets it either forms a Deposit
Insurance National Bank to facilitate the winding down of the
bank,' 99 creates a bridge bank for the continued operation of the
bank,2° or liquidates the bank2.
No banks were assumed in 2009 after the issuance of the
Final Policy Statement by private equity investors, however, more
recently there have been signs that the FDIC is serious about

196. See David Weidner, Sheila Bair, A Bailout Scourge, Has Problems of Her
Own, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748703699204575017293574319852.html.
197. See FDIC, Bank Failures in Brief, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/
index.html (last visited Feb. 4,2010).
198. See Failures and Assistance Transactions, supra note 4.
199. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Creates a Deposit Ins. Nat'l Bank of
Kaysville, Utah to Protect Insured Depositors of Barnes Banking Co., Kaysville,
Utah (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prlOO10.html; Press
Release, FDIC, FDIC Creates a Deposit Ins. Nat'l Bank to Facilitate the Resolution
of Citizens State Bank, New Baltimore, Mich. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2009/pr09235.html.
200. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Creates Bridge Bank to Take Over
Operations of Indep. Bankers' Bank, Springfield, Ill. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.fd
ic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09237.html.
201. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Approves the Payout of the Insured Deposits
of Rockbridge Commercial Bank, Atlanta, Ga. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2009/pr09233.html.
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2
allowing private equity investor groups to purchase failed banks.
In January 2010, Bond Street Bank, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Bond Street Holdings LLC, became the first private-equity group
to use an OCC shelf charter to assume assets and liabilities of a
failed insured depository institution when it bought Premier
American Bank in Florida.203 After using its shelf charter to
purchase Premier American Bank, the investment group
purchased a second bank with their charter, Florida Community

Bank, which had closed January 29, 2010.204

Similar to the

IndyMac and BankUnited deals, the investment group included
experienced bankers. 20 5 The new chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Dan Healy, was the Chief Financial Officer at NorthFork
Bank, the same bank where John Kanas of BankUnited was
Chairman and CEO.26 A second private equity investor group led
by Patrick Frawley, a former bank regulator and turnaround
specialist, used a Georgia state charter it had gained through
Community & Southern Bank, to acquire First National Bank of
Georgia.20 According to one analyst these deals signal either that
private equity bidders are bidding more or there are less bidders at
the table overall.208 The deals may also be the natural result of a
learning period as private equity investors and the FDIC learn to
accommodate one another.2l
The FDIC has also continued to look for innovative
approaches to resolving failed banks at the least possible cost to
the DIF. The resolution of Corus Bank (Corus), a Chicagoland

202. See Joe Adler, PE Buyers Strike Again as Six Banks Fail,AM. BANKER, Feb.
1, 2010, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_20pe-buyers-strike-again-as-sixbanks-fail-1006671-1.html [hereinafter Adler, PE Buyers Strike Again].
203. Id.; Marissa Fajt & Joe Adler, Failed-Bank Deal Puts Shelf Charter in
Spotlight, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 1600137
http://www.americanbanker.comlbulletins/-1006438-1.html.
204. Adler, PE Buyers Strike Again, supra note 202.
205. Fajt & Adler, supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. J. Scott Trubey, Failed Bank Brings Does of Good News for Georgia, ATE.
Bus. CHRONICLE, Jan. 30, 2010, http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atIanta/stories/2010/01/
25/daily9l.html.
208. Fajt & Adler, supra note 203.
209. See Fajt & Adler, supra note 203.
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bank that failed in September 2009, provides an example. °
Believing it would "attract different groups of bidders" and higher
prices, the FDIC conducted a split auction for Corus's assets and
First, the FDIC entered into a purchase and
deposits.1
assumption agreement with MB Financial in which MB Financial
assumed about $7 billion in deposits and $3 billion in other assets
from Corus.212 Second, in a separate auction the FDIC sold the
213
The assets, a portfolio of mostly performing
real-estate assets.
construction loans and real-estate owned
non-performing
and
assets were bought by a consortium led by commercial real-estate
Thus, the
investment developers, Starwood Capital Group.1
resolution of Corus provides not only example of a novel method
used by the FDIC, but also shows how private equity firms can
invest in real-estate loan portfolios without investing in the
chartered institution.1
More recently, the FDIC created a joint venture with
Colony Capital Acquisitions LLC (Colony) for $1 billion in
troubled real-estate loans. 6 Colony "paid $90.5 billion for a forty
217
percent stake" in the venture.
Another example of an alternative approach taken by the
FDIC and an example of investors attempting to work around
regulations, occurred while the Final Policy Statement was still
being crafted. The FDIC allowed Joe Evans, a Georgia-based
banker, to capitalize the $35 million-asset State Bank and Trust
Co. with $300 million raised from twenty-six institutional

210. See Reuters, Corus Bank Assets Sold to Investors,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at
B9, available at 2009 WLNR 19732284 (noting that Corus failed because of heavy
losses it sustained on bad commercial real estate and condominium development
loans in Florida and the Southwest).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.

214. See id. The investment group included TPG Capital and Wilbur Ross's WLR
LeFrak. See Press Release, FDIC, Corus Bank Assets - Winning Bidder Announced
(Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9183.html.
215. See Jacobius, supra note 7 (discussing real-estate money mangers' interest in
the real-estate loan portfolios of struggling or failed insured depository institutions).
216. Associated Press, supra note 79.
217. See id.; Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Winning Bidder of $1 Billion
in Loans (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prlOO03.html.
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investors 18 and to acquire control over eighty-six percent of the
failed Security Bank Corp.'s $2.8 billion in assets.219 One
commentator gave the FDIC credit for being "innovative" in its
approach to bank capitalization. 220 However, critics of the deal
note that such "club" deals, are structured so that none of the
investors would own more than a 9.9% stake in the bank, allowing
them to avoid filing with the appropriate bank regulator.22' One
reason that the FDIC may have been comfortable approving the
State Bank and Trust Co. deal is because, similar to investors in
the IndyMac and BankUnited deals, Evans had run banks the size
that he purchased and was known by the FDIC.222
A third trend emerging after the issuance of the Final
Policy Statement is that banks recapitalized by investors are
buying other banks.223 Recapitalized OneWest assumed $4.5
billion in deposits from the failed First Federal Bank of
California. Likewise, Joe Evans' State Bank and Trust Company
has purchased the assets of two more failed banks since the
Security Bank Corp. deal.225 Premier American Bank, which was
recapitalized by Bond Street Holdings, assumed the deposits of

218. Joe Adler, FDIC, Buyers Get Creative With Failures, AM. BANKER, July 28,
2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 14429036 (specifying that no private equity
investors were included in the investment group).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See Press Release, FDIC, OneWest Bank, FSB, Pasadena, Cal., Assumes All
of the Deposits of First Fed. Bank of Cal., Santa Monica, Cal. (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9239.html [hereinafter Press Release,
One West Bank]; Press Release, FDIC, State Bank and Trust Co. Macon, Ga.,
Assumes All of the Deposits of First Sec. Nat'l Bank, Norcross, Ga. (Dec. 4. 2009),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9220.html [hereinafter Press Release,
State Bank buys First Sec. Nat'l Bank]; Press Release, FDIC, State Bank and Trust
Co., Macon, Ga., Assumes All of the Deposits of Buckhead Cmty. Bank, Atlanta,
Ga. (Dec. 4.
2009),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9219.html
[hereinafter Press Release, State Bank buys Buckhead Cmty. Bank].
224. Press Release One West Bank, supra note 223.
225. See Press Release, State Bank buys First Sec. Nat'l Bank, supra note 223;
Press Release, State Bank buys Buckhead Cmty. Bank, supra note 223.
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Florida Community Bank.226 In the public sector, MB Financial
Bank raised $175 million in a secondary offering to help finance its
27
purchases of assets and liabilities from four failed Illinois banks.
-

VI. CONCLUSION

The FDIC's Final Policy Statement is one piece of an
evolving framework governing private equity investment in failed
banks.228 Whereas the actions by the Board, OCC, and FDIC
preceding the issuance of the Proposed and Final Policy
Statements eased restrictions on private equity investment in
failed insured depository institutions, the Final Policy Statement
adds additional regulations on private equity investment. The
Final Policy Statement represents an attempt by the FDIC to
reconcile the banking sector's need for capital and the FDIC's
duty to protect the DIF.229 The Final Policy Statement aims to
230
encourage "appropriate" private equity investment, meaning
investment "consistent with the . . . basic elements of insured

depository institution ownership., 231' To that end, the Final Policy
Statement encourages private equity funds to invest in failed banks
through partnerships with existing bank holding companies,
through de minimis investments, or through investment in strong

226. Press Release, FDIC, Premier Am. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Miami, Fla., Assumes
All of the Deposits of Fla. Cmty. Bank, Immokalee, Fla. (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prl0023.html [hereinafter Press Release,
Premier Am. Bank].
227. Steve Daniels, MB Financial Girds Itself with $175M Equity Offer, CRAIN'S
CHI. Bus., Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/printStory.pl?
news id=35453; see Press Release, MB Fin. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., Assumes
All of the Deposits of Benchmark Bank, Aurora, Ill. (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9223.html; Press Release, FDIC, MB
Fin. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., Assumes All of the Deposits of InBank, Oak
Forest, Ill. (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pro9162.html;
Press Release, FDIC, MB Fin. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., Assumes the Deposits
of Corus Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2009/pr09168.html.
228. See supra Part II.
229. See generally Final Policy Statement, supra note 16 at 45,440 (issuing
guidelines for private equity investment in failed insured depository institutions).
230. See supra Parts III-IV; Crittenden & Lattman, supra note 145.
231. Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,440.
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bank holding companies.232 Private equity investors making nonexempt bids for failed banks face significant restrictions on their
investment, placing such bids at a competitive disadvantage
compared to traditional banks.233 In particular non-exempt
investors face heightened capital requirements, a possible duty to
provide cross support, a mandatory three-year holding period, and
other provisions meant to promote the safety and soundness of the
banking industry.23
Despite the Final Policy Statement's restrictions, private
equity investors have been able to acquire failed insured
depository institutions.
The FDIC will have the opportunity to
reevaluate the final provisions of the Final Policy Statement, its
effect encouraging or discouraging private equity investment in
failed banks, and the desirability of private equity investment as a
whole. 36 When it does, it will do so against the backdrop of a
banking industry that has continued to deteriorate since the Final
Policy Statement was issued. The number of banks on the FDIC's
problem bank list has grown, new bank failures continue, and the
DIF now has negative reserves. 23' However, it remains to be seen
whether the FDIC will ease restrictions on private equity
investment in failed banks.23s
The two private equity acquisitions of bank charters in
January 2010 may signal a new-found willingness by the FDIC to
work with private equity investors. 239 In reality, however, it is
more likely that the acquisitions resulted from private equity
investors adjusting to meet the requirements of the FDIC. Based
on the incremental changes between the Proposed Policy
Statement and the Final Policy Statement, and because the FDIC

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 45,448.
See id. at 45,449.
Id. at 45,448-49.
See Press Release, Premier Am. Bank, supra note 226.
Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448.
Brown, supra note 5, at 16.
See Final Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 45,448-49.
See Fajt & Adler, supra note 203; Trubey, supra note 207.
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is most focused on attracting the right types of investment, it is
unlikely that FDIC will significantly alter the provisions of the
Final Policy Statement in the near future.
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